



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

tural self-fertilization through interactions between smaller systems included in the cultural group or nation are quite adequate to supply the 'yeast' themselves. Among these smaller systems the individual is one . . ." (p. 605). The action of this yeast he compares to "the breath of life, whipping into shape the heretofore unrealized possibilities of the deterministic tendencies. . . . Thus the accidental appears, after all, as predominant in history, when it comes to the particular *when, where, how, and even what*, of events. The concept of the 'uniqueness of historic events' is thus vindicated" (p. 605). The accidental or contingent is found in "the maturing of certain elements *within* a system" (*ibid.*, italics are mine). "But withal there is no denying the overwhelming weight of accidental factors" (p. 606).

Although he probably would not grant it, has not Dr. Goldenweiser here given us the best scientific evidence for a philosophic indeterminism (in this field only, of course)? The inevitableness and significance of "unforeseeable" novelties cropping up *within* a social system, and therefore neither determined from without nor (by his definition) resulting from that system itself—the inevitableness and the significance of the accidental factors appears, as we read through his discussion, with steadily increasing clearness. Quite apart from the genuine merit of his discussion as a contribution to the philosophy of science, this result should engage the serious attention of philosophers.

W. H. SHELDON.

COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

---

## REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*Moral Values: A Study of the Principles of Conduct.* WALTER GOODNOW EVERETT. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1918. Pp. xiii + 439.

Professor Everett's *Moral Values* suggests an old conundrum, *mutatis mutandis*: When is a text-book not a text-book? The answer, of course, being: When it is really readable; when it has movement and unity and other things that according to the best principles of rhetoric make for vital interest; when it lacks obvious method and arrangement; when, finally, it lives, instead of just presents, its subject. A text-book thus not a text-book is what Professor Everett has both consciously planned, to judge from his Preface, and with more than ordinary success really accomplished, to judge from the dozen, baker's dozen—in the good old times!—chapters that follow. In fact, except for an occasional excess of the

preceptual, a wiser, on the whole more readable and generally more serviceable book for university classes in ethics would be hard to find: for, with the other merits, this is a book that very well might interest, I will not say the general reader, but certainly the thoughtful reader, the general thinker; and it is a book, too, that while not doing violence to the demands of history is up to date or "progressive," being at once idealistic without being either narrow or abstractly moralistic, and pragmatic without being at all materialistic. Surely such a book has peculiar opportunity of being useful to the universities at this time.

Besides the freedom from the character of the conventional textbook, two other things, also announced in the Preface, may be mentioned with an approval almost as cordial; namely, the appropriate and especially the well-controlled use of the concept of value and, closely related to this, the purpose of being concrete.

Ethics and logic are both often defined as normative sciences. But, while thus in the same general class, they may not be regarded or presented in the same manner, being as far apart as will and thought, volition and cognition, value and idea. True, as many disasters, now meaning books, which time has presented to the history of thought, bear witness, each has had need of learning of the other. Works in ethics, for example, have often been obtrusively lacking in practise as well as in precept of logical form, being quite too—Oh, for an adjective!—too valorous, too well-meaning, too "moral," while works in logic have on their side overdone the dependence of thought and its manner on value, being too psychological, too biological, too pragmatic; but the fact that ethics and logic have needed to learn of each other is no justification of such inversions as have taken place frequently. Professor Everett's work, however, while well constructed, while itself fundamentally logical and while recognizing the great importance of knowledge and reason to moral experience and development, is no inversion, being always mindful that its primary interest is in the will and in the world as value. Witness its own persistent and pervading spirit of moral earnestness and purpose; not its sentimental moralism, for it is very largely free from that, but its genuine and candid ethics. Witness also its respect for the concrete.

With regard to the purpose to be concrete, when one comes to the actual performance there is perhaps something wanting. Some readers may feel a real lack. One does not find, for example, much direct special discussion of concrete problems, such as appears in Drake's *Problems of Conduct*, particularly in the portions given to "Personal Morality" and to "Public Morality," where questions of health and drink and sex, of patriotism and charity and privilege,

are examined. What one does find, however, is a clear, well-pointed philosophy of concreteness, making the book, so to speak, open to problems as concrete as you please. What Drake's book has lacked in the opinion of many is just such a background.

In the interest of the concrete Professor Everett denies finality and exclusiveness, say, moral adequacy, to any of the traditional formulæ, or *summa bona*, such as pleasure, happiness, duty, perfection. At best, he says (p. 177), these are only "principles to point the way one is to go." Singly or collectively they decide nothing. They "do not free one from perplexity where ways converge and cross." "Ethics," he goes on, "in striving for unity of thought, can not neglect the manifold which it would unify. . . . The abstract must be interpreted in terms of the concrete, the good must be translated into goods, value into values." In other words, the world of actual moral experience, the world of value, is no unified world; it is rather, after James, a "pluralistic universe," and one may not meet it successfully with a single, exclusive formula or rule. In practise a moral principle would stand in the way of real moral principle. A man of principle is so much better than a man of a principle; so much more reasonable and responsible, so much more efficient, so much more human; in short, so much more a man for the world as the world is actually experienced.

In place of any *summum bonum* or universal principle, Professor Everett offers, first, a "table of values," and then what the present reviewer would diagnose as a genuine trust in common human nature. History and experience being what they are and man being what he is, man being disposed in general to learn from history, to be made self-controlled and rational by his experience, human nature can be trusted to react, for character and progressive living, to the values that the world offers. Indeed, as Everett hardly makes as clear as might be wished, those very values are themselves outgrowths of experience, making a confidence in experience and human nature so much more justified. Thus, now to the table, under a broad interpretation, the only practical interpretation, morality is a matter not merely of the ordinary "character values," but also of economic values, bodily values, values of recreation and of association, and of esthetic and intellectual and religious values, these all making the "world of values." To this table, or list, of course no absolute value can attach. It is simply something to work or think by. No sanctity inheres either in the order or the number of the different values. Even the division may be a cross-division. But it is of the nature of man under the demands of his life, as his experience grows, to come to recognize and follow a hierarchy of values. Instrumental values are subordinated to intrinsic, transient to perma-

ment, productive to unproductive, and so on (p. 221 ff.), reason acting throughout as the principle of preference and organization (p. 224) and the outcome being an organically valued world and a moral, because controlled and adapted and harmonious, individual. The process, moreover, is seen not as different but as only more efficient and more productive, as well as at once more complex and more comprehensive, when it is recognized that "no values can be realized by individuals in isolation" and when accordingly due attention is given to the part of society (Chapter VIII.).

But, not to attempt further exposition, it is interesting to find that Professor Everett handles all the old time issues of intuitionism and empiricism, indeterminism and determinism, dualism, pluralism and monism, very much as he has handled that of hedonism and perfectionism. All of these, representing so many abstractions from experience and having each one some justification, but being in no instance exhaustive, are indications, in the form of isms, of conditions which always have to be reckoned with, but any one of them taken abstractly and given finality, is taken too seriously. Everett, then, does reckon with them, but does not take them too seriously. Notably, to give an example, he reckons with monism, but in discussing the problem of evil and the worth of human ideals he does not take monism too seriously and so, while giving value to its superhumanism (p. 419), is nevertheless quite able to say (p. 419), what very well marks the spirit and character throughout his book, that there is "sufficient justification" of human values and ideals "in it," again (p. 420) "is established in and through our experience." the fact that they do enrich and ennoble man's life." "Their valid-

ALFRED H. LLOYD.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

*Economic Problems of Peace after War.* (Second Series.) W. R. SCOTT. Cambridge University Press. 1918. Pp. xii + 139.

This publication is based on the second course of the H. Stanley Jevons Lectures at University College, London, delivered in 1918 by the Adam Smith Professor of Political Economy in the University of Glasgow. With a foresight that was almost as characteristic as it was commendable, British statesmen and students of public affairs long before peace was definitely in sight, gave attention to the serious problems of economic adjustment after the war, just as in the midst of hostilities they were bending every effort to enlist all available economic forces for the country's service in warfare.

Economic problems following a great modern war are of two kinds. One kind relates to the readjustment necessary to divert production from a war to a peace basis. These problems, while of press-